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Summary. Progress towards universal health coverage involves providing people with access
to needed health services without entailing financial hardship and is often advocated on the
grounds that it improves population health.The paper offers econometric evidence on the effects
of health coverage on mortality outcomes at the national level. We use a large panel data set
of countries, examined by using instrumental variable specifications that explicitly allow for
potential reverse causality and unobserved country-specific characteristics. We employ various
proxies for the coverage level in a health system. Our results indicate that expanded health
coverage, particularly through higher levels of publicly funded health spending, results in lower
child and adult mortality, with the beneficial effect on child mortality being larger in poorer
countries.
Keywords: Health coverage; Health financing; Mortality; Panel data econometrics; Reverse
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1. Introduction
The potential social and economic consequences of broader access to health services have been
highlighted by several commentators. For example, an inﬂuential report concluded that
‘: : : extending the coverage of crucial health services : : : to the world’s poor could save millions of lives
each year, reduce poverty, spur economic development, and promote global security’
(Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (2001), foreword). The growing interest in the
performance of countries in ensuring adequate access to health services has led to the de-
velopment of the concept of ‘health system coverage’, the extent to which citizens can se-
cure effective access to healthcare and enjoy protection from exposure to the ﬁnancial risk
that is associated with ill health (Shengelia et al., 2003; World Health Organization, 2010). It
is often argued that, although most of a country’s population can potentially secure health
and economic beneﬁts from improved coverage, the gains are likely to be even larger for
the poorer and less healthy individuals (World Health Organization, 2008, 2010). Relative to
their richer and healthier counterparts, these groups are, in general, at higher risk of being
deterred from seeking timely medical care and less able to secure access to insurance and credit
mechanisms that manage uncertainty about healthcare needs and costs (Preker et al., 2003).
Consequently, there have been repeated international calls for countries to move towards
achieving ‘universal health coverage’, which is commonly deﬁned as providing all people with
access to needed health services of sufﬁcient quality to be effective, without entailing ﬁnancial
hardship (World Health Organization, 2010). Higher access to basic health services and higher
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levels and shares of pooled prepaid health ﬁnancing (i.e. funds paid by citizens before the need
for medical care) are regarded as key dimensions of broader health coverage. The concept of
universal health coverage received heightened attention when the World Health Organization
64th World Health Assembly recommended that the topic should be further discussed at the
United Nations General Assembly, in light of efforts to achieve the millennium development
goals (World Health Organization, 2011a).
Acrucial premiseunderlying thepush foruniversal health coverage is that expansions inhealth
system coverage will necessarily lead to improvements in population health outcomes (see, for
example,WorldHealth Organization (2008, 2010) andGarrett et al. (2009)). Health coverage as
deﬁned above is a multi-dimensional construct, embracing both access to services and ﬁnancial
protection, and there is no single agreed measure of the level of coverage within a country.
It is commonly measured by a range of partial indicators. These include the extent of pooled
prepaid health spending, the prevalence of out-of-pocket (OOP) and ‘catastrophic’ spending
(deﬁned as health spending crossing a prespeciﬁed threshold share of a household’s disposable
income) and utilization rates of key health services. Although the link between system coverage
and population health has played a crucial role in the policy debate, the expected relationship
betweenoutcomes and coverage indicators is in fact ambiguousapriori. For example, an increase
in government health expenditure (which normally takes the form of pooled prepaid funds and
makes up themajority of national health spending)may in theory be accompanied by amatching
reduction in prepaid private health expenditures, which could in principle result in no changes in
total pooled spending, and no signiﬁcant changes in healthcare consumption and health status.
Even if government spending increases the total pool of resources devoted to healthcare, the
consequences in terms of population health may be disappointing if the additional funds are
spent inefﬁciently, or on population groups that already enjoy good health.
Some of the available empirical literature reﬂects these ambiguous predictions, as we explain
in Moreno-Serra and Smith (2012). Early research in the area focused on identifying simple
correlations between pooled health expenditures—usually publicly funded—and outcomes in
cross-country data, ﬁnding no systematic evidence of an effect on mortality indicators such as
child death rates (Musgrove, 1996). The same is true of a more rigorous empirical study by
Filmer and Pritchett (1999), which found at best very small public spending impacts on under-
5-years (‘under-5’) and infant mortality.More recently, though, a few econometric studies using
panel data have found evidence of higher publicly pooled spending leading to better mortality
outcomes. Wagstaff and Claeson (2004), examining data for up to 120 countries, estimated
reductions ranging between 0.8% and 1.5% in under-5 mortality for a 10% higher share of
government health expenditure relative to gross domestic product (GDP). Bokhari et al. (2007)
used instrumental variable (IV) regressions on a sample of 127 countries to estimate that a
10% increase in per capita government health expenditure leads to average reductions of 3.3%
and 5% in under-5 and maternal mortality rates respectively. It has also been found that the
positive health effects from increasedpooled spending tend to vary across population groups and
countries, with poor people in poorer countries beneﬁting the most from additional spending
(Bidani and Ravallion, 1997).
There is a growing econometric literature examining the relationship between health out-
comes and pooled prepayment in the form of health insurance arrangements. This litera-
ture (mostly country case-studies) generally ﬁnds improvements in healthcare use and health
status due to insurance coverage. This is so, for example, in the USA, where various stud-
ies (reviewed in Gruber (2009)) have linked better adult and infant health outcomes to the
implementation and expansion of the Medicare and Medicaid schemes. Similarly, the intro-
duction of the universal coverage scheme in Thailand has resulted in an estimated decrease
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of 6.5 infant deaths per 1000 births among the poor from 2001 to 2005 (Gruber et al., 2012).
Nonetheless, various other studies have failed to ﬁnd systematic evidence of causal links between
expanded health insurance mechanisms and outcomes (see for example Escobar et al. (2010)).
Establishing the direction and strength of the effect of health coverage on population out-
comes is essentially an empirical matter. This is not, however, a trivial task, and most of the
studies that werementioned above exhibit importantmethodological limitations. Themain con-
cern is the potential endogeneity of the indicators that are used to measure health coverage. It
is possible, for instance, that countries with unobserved factors causing poor health outcomes
might decide to broaden health system coverage through higher pooled spending to deal with
the problem, potentially leading to a spurious correlation in the data between higher pooled
spending and worse population health, and hence masking any beneﬁcial effects of additional
expenditures on outcomes. This possibility has long been recognized in the empirical literature,
yet most studies to date have been unable to address such simultaneity issues explicitly, and
their empirical conclusions may consequently be subject to substantial biases. In this scenario,
simple ordinary least squares regressions will merely reﬂect correlations in the data. Even when
more sophisticated methods have been used (such as IV estimators), the analyses have normally
relied on cross-sectional data or focused on speciﬁc countries or insurance interventions. These
factors make it difﬁcult to rule out the possibility of reverse causality and unobserved factors,
or to generalize empirical ﬁndings to other settings.
The main contribution of this study is to offer robust econometric evidence on the direction
and magnitude of health system coverage effects on mortality outcomes. We do so by using
a large panel data set of countries with annual data for a period of 14 years (1995–2008),
analysed through IV speciﬁcations that allow for potential reverse causality and unobserved
country-speciﬁc characteristics. The two-step IV strategy that is adopted starts by directly and
consistently estimating any reverse causal effects of mortality on system coverage measures.
Thus, as a further contribution to the ﬁeld, the empirical approach can shed light on the existence
and magnitude of simultaneity between population health and system coverage, which can then
be explicitly accounted for in the second estimation step that assesses the effects of coverage
on population outcomes. We employ various pooled health ﬁnancing and access indicators
as proxies for the level of coverage in a health system, reﬂecting its two main dimensions of
effective access to needed care and protection from health-related ﬁnancial hardship. We ﬁnd
that expansions in health system coverage, particularly through higher publicly pooled health
spending, result in lower child and adult mortality. We also ﬁnd that the beneﬁcial effect of
pooled health funds on child mortality is only unearthed once the important reverse causal
effect of mortality on pooled expenditures has been taken into account, and that the spending
impact is larger in poorer countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our econometric methodology. Section 3
describes the data set that is used in the analyses. Section 4 presents the results of our main
estimations and some speciﬁcation and robustness checks. Section 5 presents a discussion of
our empirical results and concludes.
The data that are analysed in the paper and the programs that were used to analyse them can
be obtained from
http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/rss-datasets
2. Methodology
Our main objective is to obtain credible estimates of the effects of health coverage indicators on
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population outcomes. However, this is difﬁcult by using a cross-sectional econometric analysis
at the country level, primarily because of the possibility of reverse causality or simultaneity in
the relationship between coverage and outcomes. A related concern is that there may also be
unobservable variables that are correlated both with the level of coverage in a country and the
outcomes of interest. The potential endogeneity of coverage indicators would lead to biased
estimated coefﬁcients if not taken into account in the regressions.
One way to address the problem of omitted variables is to follow much of the previous
literature and to take advantage of longitudinal country level data to look at changes over
time in health coverage indicators, to eliminate the effect of time invariant omitted variables.
However, coveragemeasureswill still be endogenous in the presence of reverse causality between
coverage and outcomes, or time varying confounders, or measurement error in the reporting of
coverage indicators for particular countries. In what follows, we describe the various strategies
that we use to deal with these issues.
2.1. Standard fixed effects models and reverse causality
Consider a simple model where the population health outcome of interest in country i at time t,
yit , depends on a vector Cit containing indicators of the level of health system coverage, and a
vector Xit of covariates that might potentially inﬂuence both the outcome and health coverage.
As detailed in the next section, we measure population health through mortality rates, and
coverage through health spending measures and immunization rates. This simple model can be
written as
yit =βCit + δXit + eit .1/
where eit is an error termcapturingunobservable variables and randomnoise.We candecompose
the error term in equation (1) into three components that account for different sources of
endogeneity. Let the error term be denoted as
eit =αi +θt + "it : .2/
In this formulation,αi is a country-speciﬁc effect that captures time invariant unobservables that
are potentially correlated with the levels of coverage and mortality observed in a given country.
The term θt is a period-speciﬁc intercept that captures aggregate shocks affecting mortality
outcomes in all countries at the same time. If all potential sources of endogeneity have been
accounted for in the previous two components, "it represents a random, idiosyncratic error
component. This formulation of the error term leads, by substituting equation (2) into equation
(1), to the model
yit =βCit + δXit +αi +θt + "it : .3/
This model can be estimated through a ﬁxed effects approach. In this case, the within-country
variation in outcomes and regressors over time is used to obtain the coefﬁcients of interest.
Since the country-speciﬁc effect αi is ﬁxed over time, the effects of time invariant unobservables
captured by αi are eliminated in the estimation. Fixed effects estimations with longitudinal data
require the estimated standard errors to be adjusted for arbitrary types of serial correlation and
heteroscedasticity (Bertrand et al., 2004), so in all econometric analyses in this paper we use
panel robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
The main concern is that our variables of interest, the coverage indicators contained in Cit ,
may be correlated with the error term even after removing unobserved time invariant country
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factors, owing to reverse causality or simultaneity. In this case, estimating equation (3) with ﬁxed
effects by pooled ordinary least squares would lead to biased estimates of the β-coefﬁcients.
2.2. Dealing with reverse causality: an instrumental variables approach
We adopt a two-step IV approach that seeks ﬁrstly to estimate any reverse causal effects of
mortality outcomes on coverage indicators, to adjust for these effects directly when estimating
the effects of health coverage on mortality in a second step. This methodology to deal with
the simultaneous determination of dependent variable and regressors has been suggested and
applied in a different context by Bru¨ckner (2011) but has not, to the best of our knowledge, been
used to analyse the research questions in our paper. Applied to our data and research context,
the IV strategy that is adopted makes it possible to investigate further and to tackle explicitly
the inﬂuence of endogeneity arising from reverse causality.
2.2.1. Step 1: estimation of the (reverse) causal effect of mortality outcomes on health
coverage
Consider nowa potential reverse causality of (say) poormortality outcomes leading to increased
coverage. Let this relationship be expressed as
Cit =λyit +ϕXit +γi +ωt +μit : .4/
As before, although country-speciﬁc and time-speciﬁc effects are included in the model, en-
dogeneity may still be present when health coverage is examined as a function of mortality.
So we use an IV strategy that addresses these endogeneity concerns to estimate the effects of
our mortality outcomes on health coverage indicators consistently.
An unbiased and consistent IV estimator requires that we identify one or more variables
Zit—the instruments—that are sources of exogenous variation in the mortality outcome yit .
Speciﬁcally, the instruments must be
(a) external to mortality and coverage, i.e. they must not be affected by the mortality and
coverage measures, and
(b) orthogonal to coverage, i.e. they must have an effect on coverage indicators only through
their effect on the mortality outcome (and not have by themselves a direct effect on
coverage measures).
If the identiﬁed instruments are valid according to the previous criteria, and relevant in the sense
of being reasonably correlated with the instrumented mortality indicator, they should allow us
to obtain unbiased regression coefﬁcients from an IV estimation of equation (4). This can be
done through two-stage least squares (which we call method IV-2SLS) in the case of a single
instrument, or by using the more efﬁcient two-step generalized method-of-moments (which we
call method IV-GMM) estimator in the case of more than one IV (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005;
Stock and Watson, 2000).
We use two variables as instruments for the country’s mortality level in a given year. The
ﬁrst is annual carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per capita, which can in principle be correlated
with mortality outcomes in opposite ways. Higher outdoor air pollution is often linked to a
higher incidence of potentially fatal conditions such as lower respiratory infections and chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease, in both infants and adults (Pru¨ss-U¨stu¨n and Corvala´n, 2006).
But higher CO2 emissions may also serve as a proxy for larger urban agglomerations. Com-
pared with their rural counterparts, urban populations tend to be less exposed to water-borne
conditions and diseases related to vector density (such as malaria, dengue fever, cholera and
soil-transmitted helminths), even after differences in education and income have been taken into
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account (Jamison et al., 2006; Aagard-Hansen and Chaignat, 2010). This may lead to a negative
association between CO2 emissions and child and adult mortality risks. The second instrument
that we use is the annual number of battle-related deaths in internal or international conﬂicts
for each country. Conﬂict deaths typically represent a small fraction of national mortality in our
sample (see Section 3) but will tend to be more correlated with mortality in those regions where
civil and international wars have been more frequent during our period of analysis, notably
sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.
The assumption that we make is that differences in both CO2 emissions and conﬂict deaths
will induce variations in population health status and mortality rates across countries and
within countries over time, which will in turn—and only through their effect on health status—
trigger a response in terms of coverage indicators such as pooled health expenditure and rates
of immunization. The channels for this response are reasonably intuitive. For instance, higher
incidence of respiratory diseases, and associated mortality due to worsening outdoor pollution
levels, may induce a governmental response of increased funds directed to the health sector to
improve the availability and quality of care for such conditions. In contrast, the expansion of
urban agglomerations in a given country over time, proxied by our CO2 emissionsmeasure, may
contribute to reductions in the morbidity and mortality burdens that are associated with water-
borne and vector-transmitted diseases, allowing governments to divert resources away from
the health system (e.g. towards housing infrastructure). Finally, countries that have recently
been involved in an armed conﬂict are likely to receive increased health sector support from
international donors (and increase spending from domestic sources when feasible) as a response
to the deterioration of population health, thus resulting in a rise in pooled health expenditure
and public health initiatives like immunization campaigns.
It seems reasonable to think that system coverage responses to variations in CO2 emissions
and battle-related deaths will be caused primarily by the health effects of the indicators for
CO2 emissions and battle-related deaths. In particular, although CO2 emissions may be related
to a country’s GDP (which in turn may affect coverage indicators such as government health
spending; see Acemoglu et al. (2013) and Bru¨ckner et al. (2012)), all our regressions control for
GDP per capita, so that any indirect coverage effect of CO2 emissions through GDP is taken
into account and should not invalidate our instrument. In the same vein, the inclusion of GDP
per capita in all regressions should account for any indirect effect (through changes in national
income)of civil and international conﬂicts oncoverage indicators.Moreover, forour instruments
towork less hard on overcoming unobserved heterogeneity, we have included other covariates to
capture the inﬂuence of potentially important time varying and time invariant country factors
(see below), so the instruments need only to be valid conditionally on these covariates. Finally,
we also present regression-based evidence supporting the exogeneity and relevance of the two
instruments that we use. Their relevance is assessed through F -tests of their joint signiﬁcance in
the IV regressions, and through a χ2 underidentiﬁcation test that was proposed by Angrist and
Pischke (2009) which accounts for the clustered structure of the error terms in the estimated
equations. A cluster robust version of Hansen’s overidentiﬁcation J-test is used to check the
exogeneity of the instruments in the estimated models formally (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
For each pairwise combination of mortality and coverage indicators, we estimate a separate
version of equation (4) using method IV-GMM to obtain consistent estimates of the reverse
causal effect of mortality on coverage, λ. By inspecting the sign and statistical signiﬁcance of λ,
we can infer the direction of the bias that would affect the coefﬁcients of our coverage variables
if we used a standard least squares ﬁxed effects estimator on equation (3). A positive λ would
mean that higher mortality causally leads to higher coverage, thus resulting in an estimated
coverage coefﬁcient β in equation (3) that is biased upwards, i.e. closer to 0 or ‘more positive’
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than its true value. Conversely, a negative λ would imply a negative causal effect of mortality
on coverage, leading to a standard ﬁxed effects estimate of the effect of coverage in equation (3)
that is biased downwards.
2.2.2. Step 2: estimation of the causal effect of health coverage on mortality outcomes
Our strategy is to use the results from the consistent estimation of equation (4) to avoid the
potential simultaneity and other biases that were described above. This is done, in a second
step, by estimating equation (3) through an IV procedure that expunges the reverse effect of
mortality on coverage measures. We use the IVmortality coefﬁcients λ estimated from equation
(4) to construct adjusted series of coverage indicators CÅit for each country, subtracting the effect
of mortality on each coverage indicator:
CÅit =Cit −λyit : .5/
We then use CÅit as an instrument for the corresponding coverage indicator in equation (3). Since
this procedure leads to only one constructed instrument for each coveragemeasure, equation (3)
is estimated through the IV-2SLS approach.We formally examine the relevance of the generated
instruments through the Lagrange multiplier version of the underidentiﬁcation test that was
proposed by Kleibergen and Paap (2006), which is appropriate for the case of two or more
instrumented regressors in each equation.
Our IV estimator will be free from any reverse causality bias by construction. Moreover, this
two-step IV procedure should in principle be better equipped than the standard ﬁxed effects
estimator to account for other potential sources of endogeneity in our context. Even if bias due
to reverse causality is not present in some models, the IV estimator will still offer consistent—
if less efﬁcient—estimates of health coverage effects, provided that the instruments are valid
and the error terms in equations (3) and (4) are uncorrelated, i.e. that there remain no omitted
variables affecting both changes in mortality and changes in coverage. If the error terms in
equations (3) and (4) remained correlated even after IV estimation, our estimates would be free
from simultaneity bias but still be subject to omitted variable bias, the magnitude of which is
uncertain a priori (Bru¨ckner, 2011).
Since the absence of correlation between the two relevant error terms represents an assump-
tion, it cannot be directly tested. We nevertheless undertake extensive diagnostic checks and
proxy testing to ascertain the validity of the IV approach that is adopted. Furthermore, it
should be emphasized that correlation between the error terms in the two estimated equations
will exist only if any remaining omitted variables affect within-country changes in both coverage
indicators and mortality simultaneously. Omitted variables that affect only one or the other will
not cause bias. To make it more likely that the assumption of uncorrelated error terms in equa-
tions (3) and (4) holds, we include in the IV regressions some time varying controls that should
capture changes in variables that are potentially correlated with both mortality outcomes and
health system coverage, such as within-country variations in socio-economic and demographic
factors. The introduction of country-speciﬁc (ﬁxed) effects should also largely pick up unob-
served heterogeneity due to national traits that are relatively persistent over time, such as the
quality of government and institutions.
3. Data
3.1. Period of analysis, definition of variables and sources
We use annual data that are publicly available at the country level from three databases: the
World Bank’s world development indicators (World Bank, 2011a), the World Health Organi-
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zation’s ‘Global health observatory’ (World Health Organization, 2011b), and the Institute of
Health Metrics and Evaluation’s ‘Global health data exchange’ (Institute of Health Metrics and
Evaluation, 2011). The deﬁnitions and sources of all the variables that are used in our empirical
study are given in Table A1 in the on-line appendix 1. The period of analysis is 1995–2008,
although for adult mortality rates the information for many countries is available for a slightly
more restricted period (from 1998–1999 onwards). In total, the data set includes data for 153
countries. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of all the variables, for both the full sample and
the subsample of country–year observations with purchasing-power-adjusted GDP per capita
up to $12195 (the World Bank’s gross national income threshold below which countries are
included in the low and middle income country (LMIC) group; see World Bank (2011b)).
3.2. Mortality outcomes
We measure population health status through three annual mortality indicators: under-5
mortality rates (deaths per 1000 live births), and female and male adult mortality rates (deaths
per 1000). The indicators that are available can be regarded as measures of the overall per-
formance of a health system, after controlling for other factors such as socio-economic and
demographic characteristics. Under-5 mortality tends to react relatively quickly to improve-
ments in access to and quality of healthcare provision and was selected by the international
community as a key outcome within the millennium development goals framework (United
Nations, 2011; World Health Organization, 2008). Unsurprisingly, mortality indicators tend to
be worse in the LMIC group compared with the averages in the full sample that includes high
income nations.
3.3. Health system coverage indicators
To the extent that existing data permit, we seek to capture the different dimensions of health
coverage (as deﬁned in Section 1) through measures of the level and proportion of pooled
prepaid funds in health ﬁnancing, and the actual provision of health services. The ﬁrst indicator
is government health expenditure per capita. Public spending represents the majority of health
resources in most countries and is predominantly made up of pooled funds prepaid by citizens
through channels such as social health insurance contributions or taxes. It also includes donor
funds channelled through government spending. Incremental publicly pooled spending often
takes the form of the introduction of national health insurance schemes or their expansion
to previously uncovered groups. The available evidence indicates important improvements in
access to care and ﬁnancial risk protection arising from increased pooled health ﬁnancing and
broader public insurance arrangements (Levy and Meltzer, 2004; Gruber, 2009; Escobar et al.,
2010).
Wealso include the two components of private health spending as separate coverage indicators
in themainmodels. The ﬁrst component represents privately pooled resources: voluntary health
insurance (VHI) spending per capita. The second component is non-pooled OOP payments
per capita. Extra private spending may in principle mean higher consumption of necessary
health services regardless of the source of funds (VHI or OOP), so the two indicators serve
as further coverage proxies in our baseline speciﬁcation. Nonetheless, OOP health spending
has been shown to be positively correlated with poorer ﬁnancial protection (and hence poorer
coverage), as measured by the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure across countries (Xu
et al., 2007). The degree of ﬁnancial protection in a health system is commonly associated with
the relative participation of any type of pooled prepaid funds in total health ﬁnancing (World
Health Organization, 2010a, 2012; Xu et al., 2007). Thus, to examine the ﬁnancial protection
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dimension more directly, we use OOP health spending as a share of total health expenditure
(instead of the level of OOP expenditure) in an alternative regression speciﬁcation.
We aim to capture further the health effect of effective access to care through a constructed im-
munization indicator. Immunization rates are widely used asmarkers of the overall performance
of health systems in guaranteeing effective access to necessary care (WorldHealthOrganization,
2008). In our data set, annual cross-country information for the period of study is available for
six immunization rates: diphtheria–tetanus–pertussis, hepatitis type B, haemophilus inﬂuenzae
type B, polio, Bacillus Calmette–Gue´rin and measles. We summarize the information that is
provided by these six indicators by constructing an aggregate immunization rate variable, rep-
resenting the median rate across the six categories of immunization for a given country–year
observation.
Government health spending per capita in the whole sample is around three times larger than
the average OOP spending per capita. OOP spending represents over a third of national health
ﬁnancing on average in the full sample, whereas VHI spending is not a large component of
health ﬁnancing in the vast majority of countries. LMICs exhibit lower rates of immunization
and substantially lower per capita health spending ﬁgures compared with the corresponding full
sample averages, with a higher share of OOP payments in total health spending.
3.4. Instruments and remaining covariates
As discussed in Section 2.2, we use two variables as instruments for the observed mortality
rates in each country. The ﬁrst is annual CO2 emissions per capita in tonnes. The average
of the full sample is more than double that of the LMIC group. The second instrument,
annual battle-related deaths in conﬂicts, exhibits a higher average in the LMIC subsample
than in the full sample. These sample averages are still relatively low, however, and are partic-
ularly driven by the occurrence of conﬂicts in low income nations over the period of study.
The covariates that are used in the econometric analyses control for cross-country hetero-
geneity in terms of national income (GDP per capita), formal education (the primary ed-
ucation enrolment rate) and demographic proﬁle (shares of population aged 0–14 and over
65 years). All models estimated in this paper also include a full set of year-speciﬁc indicators
(time dummy variables) to capture the effects of common aggregate shocks during the study
period.
4. Results
4.1. Preliminary analyses: what the raw data tell us
We ﬁrst examine raw correlations between changes in our coverage measures between 1995
and 2008 and changes in outcomes. We use 5-year average values of coverage indicators for
the period 1995–1999 as the initial data points, and average values for 2004–2008 as the ﬁnal
data points. We then divide countries into terciles of increase in each coverage indicator, where
the bottom tercile comprises those countries with the smallest increases in coverage between
the initial and ﬁnal periods, whereas the top quartile contains those countries with the largest
increases in coverage in the same time span.
For brevity, Fig. 1 shows only the evolution of under-5 mortality rates across the bottom and
top tercile groups of increase in government health expenditure (Fig. 1(a)) and immunization
coverage (Fig. 1(b)). These unadjusted comparisons show that countries in the bottom tercile of
increase in government expenditure per capita actually exhibited faster decreases in under-
5 mortality. Moreover, mortality rates for female and male adults do not seem to have followed
different paths according to changes in health spending (the graphs are not shown). In contrast,
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 1. Average under-5 mortality over time across groups (terciles) of countries with the largest and smallest
increases in health coverage indicators, 1995–2008 (— —, bottom tercile of increase; , top tercile
of increase): (a) terciles of increases in mean government expenditure on health ($100 per capita), from
1995–1999 to 2004–2008; (b) terciles of increase in mean immunization coverage (10s of percentage points),
from 1995–1999 to 2004–2008
under-5 mortality—and adult mortality—improved faster over the period in countries with the
largest expansions in immunization rates.
Although in the raw data larger increases in government health expenditure per capita seem
to have little association with improvements in mortality, it is noteworthy that the group of
countries with the largest increases in government spending is formed mainly by high income
countries. These started the period at a much lower baseline in terms of mortality levels, com-
pared with countries in the bottom tercile of increase in spending. It seems plausible to argue
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that $1 of extra public spending might yield higher marginal returns in terms of outcomes for
lower income countries compared with richer nations, thus helping to explain this result and
indicating the importance of adjusting the coverage–outcome relationships for differences in
national income, as well as examining the possibility of differential effects of health coverage
expansions according to national income levels.
4.2. Main regression results
4.2.1. The causal effect of mortality outcomes on health coverage
Theﬁrst stepof our IVapproach,whichwasoutlined inSection2.2, involves the estimationof the
reverse causal effects of mortality outcomes on each of our health spending and immunization
variables. For each coverage measure as dependent variable, we estimate three separate versions
of equation (4)—each having one of the mortality rates as regressor of interest, plus the other
covariates that were described above—using an IV-GMM procedure. In each equation, the
corresponding mortality rate is instrumented by our two chosen instruments: CO2 emissions
and conﬂict deaths. The IV models perform well in this ﬁrst step, according to tests for both
the relevance and the validity of the instrument set. The results of these tests are presented and
discussed in more detail in the on-line appendix 2.
Generally, the response of coverage indicators to changes inmortality rates does not appear to
be substantial. The estimated mortality coefﬁcients (the λ from equation (4)) normally fail to be
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels, as shown in Table A2 (in the on-line appendix 2).
However, in one particular instance—the effect of under-5 mortality variations on government
health spending—the point estimate is relatively sizable and comes very close to conventional
statistical signiﬁcance. It implies that an increase of 1 standard deviation in under-5 mortality
(48.9 deaths per 1000) leads to an average governmental response of around a $0.25 increase in
health spending per person, or $8.1 million in total public health expenditure. For comparison,
this spending effect is roughly 25 times larger than the measured governmental response to a
1-standard-deviation increase in adult male mortality (around $0.01 per capita, or $0.3 million
in total).
The low p-value and positive sign of the estimated under-5mortality coefﬁcient, coupled with
the generally positive sign of the coefﬁcients of the other two mortality variables in on-line ap-
pendix Table A2, suggest the possibility of obtaining standard (non-IV) ﬁxed effects estimates
of the effect of coverage measures onmortality that are biased towards 0 or positive values. This
adds to the potential biases arising from time varying omitted variables andmeasurement error,
to which the standard ﬁxed effects estimator is particularly vulnerable comparedwith IV estima-
tion.
4.2.2. The causal effect of health coverage on mortality outcomes
We present in Table 2 the results from the estimation of equation (3) for each mortality
outcome. The ﬁrst column for a given outcome shows the results of the standard least squares
ﬁxed effects estimation, whereas the second column shows the corresponding IV estimation
results. The latter are obtained by instrumenting each of the coverage indicators in the regres-
sion by their generated, reverse-causality-adjusted counterpart obtained from the ﬁrst IV step
previously described. So, for example, column (2) presents the IV-2SLS-estimated effects of
coverage measures on under-5 mortality, where the instrument for government health spending
is generated as in equation (5), and likewise for the other spending and immunization vari-
ables. To make the interpretation of estimated coefﬁcients and cross-country comparisons more
intuitive, we use natural units of the variables and rescale our rate and share regressors to be ex-
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Table 2. Baseline results for the effects of health coverage on mortality†
Results for under-5 Results for female Results for male
mortality rate mortality rate (adult) mortality rate (adult)
FE-LS, IV-2SLS, FE-LS, IV-2SLS, FE-LS, IV-2SLS,
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Government health 0.581 −13.193 −1.218 −2.583 −1.019 −2.210
spending per capita (0.009) (0.018) (0.102) (0.050) (0.070) (0.025)
VHI health spending 0.556 −6.143 0.680 5.153 0.595 8.731
per capita (0.155) (0.507) (0.542) (0.161) (0.485) (0.172)
OOP health spending 0.856 2.685 −0.754 −23.385 −1.487 −15.545
per capita (0.179) (0.594) (0.753) (0.040) (0.530) (0.016)
Immunization coverage −1.962 −2.203 −1.957 −9.841 −1.123 −7.858
(0.000) (0.073) (0.242) (0.030) (0.450) (0.020)
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st-stage underidentiﬁ-
cation Lagrange
multiplier test
(statistic)
8.50 46.81 31.75
1st-stage underidentiﬁ-
cation Lagrange
multiplier test (p-
value)
0.004 0.000 0.000
F -statistic 17.75 3.95 11.52 4.40 23.68 9.89
F -statistic (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of countries 153 153 148 148 148 148
Observations 1397 1397 1222 1222 1222 1222
†The time period is 1995–2008. Themodels were estimated by standard least squares ﬁxed effects (method FE-LS)
or IVs through a two-stage least squares approach (method IV-2SLS), using as instruments the reverse-causality-
adjusted coverage indicators (see the text). All regressions also control for GDP per capita, the primary education
enrolment rate, the share of population aged 0–14 years and the share of population aged over 65 years. p-
values (in parentheses under the coefﬁcients) are from two-sided t-tests with standard errors robust to arbitrary
heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation. Entries in italics indicate coefﬁcients that are statistically signiﬁcant at
the 10% level of conﬁdence or below.
pressed as tenths (e.g. 10 percentage points of immunization coverage), and per capita variables
to be expressed as hundreds (e.g. $100 of government health spending per capita).
We formally assess the adequacy of IV modelling in our data, compared with standard least
squares ﬁxed effects estimation, by assessing the likely exogeneity of coverage indicators through
tests of difference in Hansen statistics (Baum et al., 2007; Schaffer, 2012). These tests strongly
reject the exogeneity of the coverage variables in all three mortality regressions with p-values
lower than 0.025, thus pointing to the need for IV estimation as opposed to a standard ﬁxed
effects strategy. Also, as shown in the bottom section of Table 2, in all instances the statistical
tests support the relevance of the generated instruments, strongly rejecting underidentiﬁcation
in the ﬁrst stage of the IV estimations.
The focus here is on the estimated effects of our proxies for the various dimensions of health
system coverage: government, VHI and OOP health spending per capita, and the rate of im-
munization. In addition to these variables and country-speciﬁc effects, all regressions control
for GDP per capita, the primary education enrolment rate, the share of population aged 0–14
years, the share of population aged over 65 years and a full set of year dummy variables (the
results for these covariates have been omitted for conciseness).
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4.2.2.1. Pooled prepaid health spending. The preferred IV estimations strongly indicate
that higher levels of government health expenditure per capita lead to better population out-
comes, measured either by under-5 or adult mortality rates. The point estimates, which are all
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, imply economically important effects: a $100 increase
in government spending per capita results in a reduction of 13.2 per 1000 in under-5 mortal-
ity (Table 2, column (2)), as well as decreases of around 2.6 and 2.2 per 1000 in the mortality
rates for adult females and males respectively (columns (4) and (6)). Using an IV estimator to
account for the putative endogeneity of government health spending leads to larger estimated
effects of public spending on mortality, compared with the equivalent standard ﬁxed effects
estimates. The most noteworthy case is that of under-5 mortality, for which we found stronger
evidence of reverse causality in the ﬁrst step of the IV modelling. Although the standard ﬁxed
effects estimator counterintuitively suggests a positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect of pub-
lic health spending on deaths in children under 5 years old, accounting for any reverse causality
or omitted variable bias through IV leads to a large and negative point estimate. This conﬁrms
the expected upward bias of the standard ﬁxed effects estimate, which is suggested in on-line
appendix Table A2. As for privately pooled health expenditure, there is no evidence that vari-
ations in VHI spending are related to variations in mortality outcomes. In all instances the
estimated IV (or standard ﬁxed effects) coefﬁcients are nowhere near statistical signiﬁcance.
4.2.2.2. Private out-of-pocket health spending. The IV estimations suggest a negative ef-
fect of private OOP health spending on adult mortality. The point estimates are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level and indicate reductions of around 23.4 female and 15.6 male deaths
per 1000 in response to a $100 higher per capita OOP expenditure (Table 2, columns (4) and
(6)). These effects are much larger than those implied by the (statistically insigniﬁcant) standard
ﬁxed effects estimates. They are also substantially larger than the corresponding adult mortality
estimates for government health spending. The comparative efﬁciency of incremental health
ﬁnancing through public as opposed to private sources is a matter that we further explore below.
In contrast, higher OOP spending does not seem to affect under-5 mortality systematically,
judged by the small and statistically insigniﬁcant point estimates.
4.2.2.3. Immunization coverage. As in the case of government spending, the results that are
shown in Table 2 for the rate of immunization strongly indicate that expansions in health cover-
age per se lead to improvements in population health. The statistically signiﬁcant IV coefﬁcients
suggest reductions of around 2.2 under-5 deaths per 1000 live births (column (2)), and 9.8 and 7.9
fewer female and male adult deaths per 1000 (respectively; columns (4) and (6)), in response to
an increase of 10 percentage points in the immunization coverage rate.Once again, IV estimation
generates larger point estimates than those from the standard ﬁxed effects model that makes no
adjustment for reverse causality, in particular for adult mortality outcomes.
4.3. Further specification and robustness checks
In this section, we undertake a battery of tests to check whether the health coverage effects that
were identiﬁed previously are robust to changes in the econometric speciﬁcation and estimation
sample. Our focus is on the stability of the statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of health coverage
indicators found in the preferred IV-2SLS estimations (Table 2). Therefore, in Table 3 we display
the results of the speciﬁcation and robustness checks for three indicators: government health
spending,OOPhealth spending and immunization coverage. For each of these variables, the ﬁrst
row shows the statistically signiﬁcant baseline coefﬁcients that were found in the IVmodels from
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Table 2, followed by the corresponding coefﬁcients and statistical signiﬁcance levels estimated
in each speciﬁcation and robustness test. All models in this section are estimated by using our
IV-2SLS procedure with the same covariates as before and pass the diagnostic tests that were
discussed in the previous sections (the results are not shown).
4.3.1. Allowance for lagged coverage effects
It seems reasonable to expect current expansions in health coverage to have different effects
over time depending on the health outcome that is analysed. Moreover, for some outcomes, the
cumulative health effect of expanded coverage over the years may be larger than any such effects
measured contemporaneously. Focusing only on contemporaneous effects may therefore mask
important non-linearities in health effects over time.
Todealwith these issues,we estimate aﬁnite distributed lag speciﬁcation as an extensionof our
baseline model. Assuming up to 2-year lagged coverage effects, equation (3) can be rewritten as
yit =β1Cit +β2Ci,t−1 +β3Ci,t−2 + δXit +αi +θt + "it : .6/
So we add to our baseline model the ﬁrst and second lags of each coverage indicator. The
cumulative effect of coverage on the health outcome yit will then be given by the sum of the
contemporaneous and lagged estimated effects. We estimate equation (6) through the preferred
IV approach, using the ﬁrst and second lags of the generated variables CÅit as instruments for
the observed lagged coverage values. For each mortality outcome and health coverage variable
in Table 3, row (a) shows the estimated sum of the coefﬁcients of contemporaneous and lagged
effects from equation (6). We have also estimated alternative models by using further lags for
each regressor of interest (t − 3, t − 4 and t − 5). In no case did we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant
effects of lagged variables corresponding to years beyond t −2 (the results are not shown).
The keymessage from these estimations is that the baselinemortality results aremostly robust
to the inclusion of lagged coverage measures, and the effects of coverage indicators onmortality
seem in the main to be adequately captured by the baseline model with contemporaneous
effects. There appear to be delayed effects of variations in immunization coverage on adult
mortality rates, suggesting that the baseline model may yield underestimated immunization
effects for these outcomes. In contrast, the estimated effect of immunization on the under-5
mortality rate, and that of government health spending on adult female mortality, becomes
smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant at conventional levels (compared with the baseline) when
lags are included.
4.3.2. Exclusion of outliers
A visual examination of the raw data shows some data points that, given their noteworthy
discrepancy from the values that are observed in the rest of the sample, might be distorting the
conclusions of our empirical exercise.We use a formal statistical procedure that was proposed by
Billor et al. (2000) to identify the outliers. The procedure leads to the nomination of 11 country–
year observations as mortality outliers, mainly due to adult mortality rates in excess of 500 per
1000: Botswana (years 2001–2006), Swaziland (2004–2007) and South Africa (2007). Another
30 observations for high income countries are considered outliers in terms of our spending
indicators: Luxembourg (2002–2006), the Netherlands (2003–2005), Switzerland (1995–1996
and 1999–2007) and the USA (1995–1996 and 1998–2006).
We then rerun our baseline IV-2SLS models excluding the 41 outlying observations. The
estimates in Table 3 (row (b) for each coverage variable) show that our main IV results for
government health expenditure are largely robust to the exclusion of outliers. The new results
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Table 3. Specification and robustness checks for the baseline effects of health coverage on mortality†
Results for under-5 Results for female Results for male
mortality rate, mortality rate (adult), mortality rate (adult),
IV-2SLS, (1) IV-2SLS, (2) IV-2SLS, (3)
Government health spending
Baseline −13.193 −2.583 −2.210
(0.018) (0.050) (0.025)
(a) With ﬁrst and second lags
(sum of all coefﬁcients)
−7.860 −1.377 −1.966
(0.034) (0.212) (0.043)
(b) Excluding outliers −16.291 −2.877 −2.166
(0.022) (0.022) (0.046)
(c) Excluding years before 1999 −8.341 −2.163 −2.303
(0.026) (0.050) (0.015)
OOP health spending
Baseline −23.385 −15.545
(0.040) (0.016)
(a) With ﬁrst and second lags
(sum of all coefﬁcients)
−25.693 −14.928
(0.085) (0.048)
(b) Excluding outliers −14.022 −12.475
(0.012) (0.006)
(c) Excluding years before 1999 −22.731 −15.066
(0.045) (0.018)
(d) OOP as a share of total health
spending
34.196 38.934
(0.031) (0.012)
Immunization coverage
Baseline −2.203 −9.841 −7.858
(0.073) (0.030) (0.020)
(a) With ﬁrst and second lags
(sum of all coefﬁcients)
−0.807 −13.419 −9.870
(0.503) (0.052) (0.043)
(b) Excluding outliers −1.807 −6.447 −5.947
(0.212) (0.027) (0.016)
(c) Excluding years before 1999 −1.808 −7.968 −5.993
(0.054) (0.043) (0.037)
†For each health coverage indicator, the ﬁrst row shows the statistically signiﬁcant two-stage least squares (method
IV-2SLS) coefﬁcients found in thebaselinemodels (presented inTable 2), followedby the corresponding coefﬁcients
estimated in each speciﬁcation and robustness test. Test (a) adds the ﬁrst and second lags of the coverage indicators
and the estimates refer to the sum of the contemporaneous and lagged effects. Test (b) excludes 41 outlying
observations. Test (c) excludes the period 1995–1998 from the estimations. Test (d) includes as coverage measures
only OOP health expenditure as a share of the total (instead of OOP spending per capita), total health expenditure
and the rate of immunization. All regressions also control for GDP per capita, the primary education enrolment
rate, the share of population aged 0–14 years, the share of population aged over 65 years and country and year
ﬁxed effects. p-values (in parentheses under the coefﬁcients) are from two-sided t-tests with standard errors robust
to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation.
for OOP spending effects on adult mortality are still statistically signiﬁcant as well, although the
point estimates are somewhat smaller than the corresponding baseline estimates. This suggests
that some observations with very high OOP spending values and very low mortality rates are
partly driving the baseline estimation results for this particular indicator. The exclusion of
outliers makes the baseline estimated effect of immunization coverage on under-5 mortality
again lose conventional statistical signiﬁcance, although its point estimate is close to the baseline.
4.3.3. Exclusion of the period before 1999
Our data are notably sparser for the years before 1999, in particular as far as adult mortality
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rates are concerned: there are usable estimation data for about 61 countries on average between
1995 and 1998. To avoid concerns about bias in our estimations due to the overrepresentation
of countries with better reporting systems in the sample before 1999, we estimate our baseline
IV speciﬁcations by using a restricted sample containing data only for the period 1999–2008.
The estimates in Table 3 (row (c) for each coverage indicator) are reassuring in terms of the
robustness of our baseline results to the use of a shorter period of analysis, with estimated
effects generally similar to the baseline results.
4.3.4. Share of out-of-pocket health payments
The baseline estimates point to beneﬁcial effects of higher OOP health spending levels on adult
mortality. This is consistent with the hypothesis that higher spending, from whatever source,
tends to improve outcomes through consumption of necessary healthcare. It has been argued,
however, that the incidence of catastrophic health payments—themost commonly usedmeasure
of ﬁnancial risk protection in a health system—is closely and negatively associated with the pro-
portion of national health spending funded privately through OOP payments (see, for example,
World Health Organization (2012)). We thus estimate an alternative econometric speciﬁcation
replacing OOP expenditure per capita by OOP payments as a share of total health expenditure.
Given that private health spending is virtually equivalent to OOP health spending in many
countries in the sample, we estimate speciﬁcations including as coverage measures only total
health expenditure, OOP health expenditure as a share of the total and the immunization rate
(in addition to the income, education, demographic and time dummy controls). We generate
instruments for these spending measures and perform IV-2SLS estimations as explained in
Section 2.2.
The estimation results for this speciﬁcation test are presented in Table 3 (row (d) for the OOP
health spending variable). Keeping the level of national health spending constant, a higher
share of OOP spending has a deleterious effect on both adult mortality outcomes. The IV
point estimates, which are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, suggest that an increase of
10 percentage points in the share of OOP health ﬁnancing leads to increases of over 34 deaths
of adult females and males per 1000. To put this result into context, a 10-percentage-point
increase in the share of OOP payments over total health expenditure is close to moving from
the sample average (share of OOP, 34%) to the average among low income countries (share of
OOP, 46%). Therefore, there is strong evidence that health coverage expansions in the form
of improved ﬁnancial risk protection—proxied by reductions in the share of OOP payments in
health ﬁnancing—have a beneﬁcial effect on population health.
4.3.5. Allowance for differential coverage effects in low and middle income countries
The examination of the raw data in Section 4.1 suggested the possibility of non-linear effects
of health coverage expansions according to national income levels, possibly because poorer
countries started the study periodwith worsemortality conditions and remained so throughout.
The inclusion of country-speciﬁc effects should capture any confounding inﬂuence of initial
levels of mortality for the estimation of coverage effects. Furthermore, the inclusion of time
varying controls coupled with appropriate instrumentation of coverage measures should pick
up the inﬂuence of unobservable, temporally correlated country factors that may make some
nations more likely to experience (say) high mortality over time, or so-called ‘spurious’ state
dependence (Heckman andBorjas, 1980). But we further explore whether, for a given expansion
in health coverage, countries that are characterized by lower income and hence higher mortality
rates tend to obtain larger marginal health gains than their richer counterparts.
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We estimate an extension of equation (3), adding interaction terms between an LMIC indica-
tor (equal to 1 if the country–year observation has a GDP per capita up to $12195; 0 otherwise)
and each of the health spending and immunization variables, i.e. adding one Cit ×LMICi term
for each coverage measure. The results from the interacted speciﬁcations, estimated by method
IV-2SLS using the full sample of countries, are presented in Table 4. For each mortality out-
come, the ﬁrst column presents the results from model (3) expanded by the inclusion of the four
interacted coverage terms. Each interaction term is instrumented by the corresponding gener-
ated coverage instrument interacted with LMICi. The second column for each adult mortality
outcome displays the results from a model where the coverage indicators are the share of OOP
health spending over total, total health spending per capita and the immunization rate (as in
the robustness test in Section 4.3.4), plus their interactions with LMICi. The estimated sums of
the coefﬁcients of main effects and interaction terms give the total estimated health coverage
effects for LMICs.
The ﬁrst conclusion from Table 4 is that the beneﬁcial effect of higher public health spending
onunder-5mortality is substantially larger forLMICs.Column (1) showsan estimated reduction
of about 90deaths of childrenunder 5 years old per 1000 for a $100 increase in government health
expenditures: an effect that is over six times larger than the average effect estimated for the full
sample of countries. In contrast, there is weaker evidence that additional public health spending
has larger adult mortality effects in the LMIC group (columns (2) and (4)). And, although
additional OOP health spending per capita is also linked to larger adult health beneﬁts in the
LMIC group, a higher share of OOP payments in total health ﬁnancing is once again found to
result in poorer outcomes. The latter set of results should nevertheless be treated with caution,
since the IV models in columns (3) and (5) are the only ones in our paper for which the null
hypothesis of ﬁrst-stageunderidentiﬁcation cannotbe statistically rejected.Finally, the estimates
for higher immunization coverage in the LMIC group indicate adult mortality reductions that
are similar in size to the baseline results for the full sample, with no evidence of effects in the
under-5 mortality model.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The pursuit of universal health coverage has become an important policy objective in many
countries, given added impetus by publication of World Health Organization (2010). An
important justiﬁcation for the push towards universal coverage is the assumption that it will
lead to improvements in population health, which is a fundamental goal of any health system.
Credible empirical evidence on this link is still scarce, however. The main purpose of this study
is to employ a robust statistical methodology to provide evidence on the causal relationship
between national levels of health system coverage and mortality outcomes.
We assemble a large panel data set with data for the period 1995–2008 encompassing 153
countries, and we measure the degree of health system coverage by a range of indicators,
including measures of pooled prepaid health expenditure and rates of immunization. To answer
our research question reliably, we use a two-step IV approach that directly estimates potential
reverse causal effects of under-5 and adult mortality levels on coverage indicators. In con-
trast with the available literature in the area, our approach allows us to estimate the effect
of changes in health outcomes on coverage indicators directly and to adjust explicitly for any
such effects when estimating the effects of coverage on mortality, as well as to obtain estim-
ates of coverage effects that are consistent in the presence of relevant omitted variables and
measurement error. We subject our baseline empirical models to a battery of speciﬁcation and
robustness tests, including examination of the inﬂuence of delayed coverage effects and country
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Table 4. Estimates of coverage effects in LMICs†
Results for under-5 Results for female Results for male
mortality rate, IV-2SLS, mortality rate (adult), mortality rate (adult),
(1) IV-2SLS IV-2SLS
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Sum of coefﬁcients of main effect and interaction terms
Government health spending
per capita
−90.772 −18.414 −12.004
(0.069) (0.135) (0.120)
OOP health spending per capita −49.014 −37.914
(0.051) (0.020)
Immunization coverage −0.011 −9.406 −7.185
(0.997) (0.036) (0.021)
OOP health spending (share 34.439 15.902
of total) (0.036) (0.939)
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st-stage underidentiﬁcation
Lagrange multiplier test
(statistic)
4.96 17.58 1.06 5.39 0.01
1st-stage underidentiﬁcation
Lagrange multiplier test
(p-value)
0.026 0.000 0.303 0.020 0.911
F -statistic: 2nd stage 1.98 2.99 2.05 7.84 2.45
F -statistic: 2nd stage (p-value) 0.007 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.001
Number of countries 153 148 148 148 148
Observations 1397 1222 1222 1222 1222
†For each health coverage indicator, the table shows the two-stage least squares (method IV-2SLS) estimates from
modelswhere the baseline speciﬁcation is expanded through the inclusion of interaction terms between an indicator
for LMIC (equal to 1 if the country–year observation has a GDP per capita up to $12195; 0 otherwise) and each
of the health spending and immunization variables. All regressions also control for GDP per capita, the primary
education enrolment rate, the share of population aged 0–14 years and the share of population aged over 65 years.
p-values (in parentheses under coefﬁcients) are from two-sided t-tests with standard errors robust to arbitrary
heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation. Entries in italics indicate coefﬁcients that are statistically signiﬁcant at
the 10% level of conﬁdence or below.
income levels, outlying observations, changes in the period of analysis and using a speciﬁc proxy
for the degree of ﬁnancial risk protection in the health system.
Our results (which are summarized for convenience in Table 5) strongly indicate that expan-
sions in health system coverage through higher publicly pooled spending lead, on average, to
improved population health measured by lower child and adult mortality rates. The magnitude
of the estimated effects varies according to the speciﬁc mortality outcome in question. The es-
timated gains are the largest when under-5 mortality is examined: on average, a 10% increase in
government expenditure per capita results in approximate reductions of 7.9 deaths of children
under 5 years old per 1000, and at least 1.3 deaths per 1000 in adultmortality rates. If we focus on
LMICs, the estimated effect of a 10% increase in public spending is to reduce under-5 mortality
by over 12 deaths per 1000: a 1.5-times-larger effect than in the full sample. Importantly, we
ﬁnd that the beneﬁcial and sizable effect of government health spending on under-5 mortality is
only uncovered once the positive response of public spending to increased mortality is adjusted
for, which may explain some ambiguous results from previous empirical literature in the area
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Table 5. Summary of results for the effects of health coverage on mortality†
Results for a 10% increase in the following indicators:
Government VHI health OOP health OOP health Immunization
health spending spending spending spending coverage
per capita per capita per capita (share of total) rate
Under-5 (−) 7.9 per 1000 No effect No effect No effect Negative signiﬁcant
mortality rate effect not robust
Female mortality (−) 1.6 per 1000 No effect (−) 4.4 per 1000 (+) 11.6 per 1000 (−) 8.5 per 1000
rate (adult)
Male mortality (−) 1.3 per 1000 No effect (−) 2.9 per 1000 (+) 13.6 per 1000 (−) 6.8 per 1000
rate (adult)
†The table presents the baseline estimated incremental effect, on each health outcome, for a 10% increase in the
corresponding coverage indicator (relative to the observed average in the data). Models were estimated through
two-stage least squares (method IV-2SLS). Incremental effects are expressed in deaths per 1000. ‘(+)’ denotes
an increase (a positive regression coefﬁcient) and ‘(−)’ denotes a decrease (a negative regression coefﬁcient). ‘No
effect’ denotes that no statistically signiﬁcant effect was found in the baseline model. ‘Signiﬁcant effect not robust’
denotes that a statistically signiﬁcant effect was found in the baseline model but not across robustness tests.
(e.g. Musgrove (1996) and Filmer and Pritchett (1999)). Our results are consistent with the in-
tuitive notion that governments and international donors may increase health system funding
and service coverage when there is a worsening in child mortality, which is a general and often
readily available indicator of population health.
The real world relevance of the estimated pooled health spending effects is not trivial, as
a simple calculation of saved life-years can illustrate. According to the coefﬁcients from the
baseline IV speciﬁcation for under-5 mortality, and ﬁgures for average country population aged
0–4 years, average under-5 mortality rate and life expectancy at age 5 years, the average country
would see a total of 451 lives and 30443 years of life saved for an extra $1 of government health
spending per capita (see the on-line appendix 3 for details of the calculations). For the average
LMIC, the point estimates would imply even larger totals of 3707 lives and 240061 life-years
saved per country, for an extra $1 of government spending per capita. These calculations imply
public health spending ﬁgures per life saved of around $72000 for the typical country, and
only $9400 per life saved for the typical lower income country. This result also implies that the
marginal cost of saving a year of life is on average around $1000 in thewhole sample of countries,
whereas the analogous ﬁgure for an LMIC is just $145. These ﬁgures compare very favourably
with a widely cited benchmark of $100000 used in high income countries as the implicit value
of a year of life in perfect health (Cutler and McClellan, 2001).
In addition to looking at pooled health funds channelled through the public sector, the
data allow us to disaggregate private health spending into prepaid VHI and non-pooled OOP
payments. For the average country, publicly pooled spending seems far more effective in
reducing mortality than pooled private VHI funds, although it should be noted that there
is a high frequency of zero VHI values in the sample (particularly in lower income countries),
and generally very small non-zero ﬁgures (more than half of our country–year observations
have VHI expenditure per capita that is lower than $0.05), thus making it difﬁcult to identify
VHI effects from variations at the aggregate level.
Our analysis yields interesting insights into the aggregate health effects of non-pooled private
spending. Higher levels of OOP health spending per capita are linked to lower adult mortality,
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though the baseline estimates are substantially reduced by the removal of outliers from the
sample. If we take into account the large, negative estimated effect of public spending on under-
5 deaths (compared with no effect of OOP spending on the same outcome), the effects of an
additional $1 of pooled and non-pooled health spending on overall mortality are similar in
magnitude, with a somewhat larger total effect for pooled spending in elasticity terms (see
Table 5). But we also ﬁnd that a higher share of non-pooled OOP expenditure in national
health ﬁnancing has a large detrimental effect on adult mortality, controlling for the level of
national health expenditure. The implication is that, although incremental health expenditure
might improve population health even if such spending is OOP (possibly through additional
utilizationof healthcare by thosewho canafford topay), larger healthbeneﬁtswouldbeobtained
if the extra funds were channelled through pooled prepaid sources. Thus, in addition to their
potential ﬁnancial protection beneﬁts per se, pooled prepayment mechanisms seem more likely
to maximize the efﬁciency of additional health funds in terms of generating better population
outcomes than extra OOP spending.
Our ﬁnding that immunization coverage is linked more robustly to adult health than to
child health may be at least partly explained by the fact that broader immunization coverage is
frequently achieved through public health campaigns undertaken by governments. Therefore,
most of the immediate health beneﬁts of immunization for children may end up being captured
by the government health spending variable that is included in our models (i.e. through higher
public spending). For people aged 15–60 years, however, the immunization variable seems more
likely to act as a proxy for the overall conditions of access to care in the health system, rather than
to capture the direct health beneﬁts of vaccination. In our sample, rates of immunization show
a strong degree of correlation with other frequently used indicators of care access, including the
share of births attended by skilled personnel, physician density and out-patient visits. The robust
ﬁnding of improved adult health linked to higher immunization coverage therefore conﬁrms the
suggestion that broader access to healthcare is an important instrument for countries to achieve
better population health.
Some limitations that were imposed on our study by the data that were available must be
acknowledged. First, although we use some widely cited health coverage measures, the analysis
would have been richer if panel data on other potential coverage proxies—such as measures of
out-patient and in-patient visits, catastrophic health spending incidence and barriers to access
to healthcare—were available for a reasonable number of countries during the study period.
Unfortunately, indicators that are usually employed in cross-sectional country comparisons (e.g.
births attended by skilled personnel and out-patient visits at health centres) are not available as
a usable time series for most countries. International agencies could play a key role in collating
and disseminating the growing amount of information that is provided by national level annual
surveys, which often contain questions on issues such as effective access to care (International
Household SurveyNetwork:http://www.internationalsurveynetwork.org).Also,
for this study we assess population health by using mortality indicators. The analysis would be
enriched if a broader set of indicators were available on aspects such as health-related quality of
life and equity,which are explicit objectives inmanyhealth systems (WorldHealthOrganization,
2010a). Although the quality of the data sets that we use can be challenged, they nevertheless
represent the most complete time series information available at the country level, and our
IV estimation should be an appropriate strategy for dealing with any confounding effects of
measurement error in the analyses.
Second, in common with the previous cross-country literature in the area, our research has
no overt natural experiment to exploit to identify the effects of changes in health coverage
on population outcomes. We contribute to the available literature in the ﬁeld by using an IV
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approach that attempts to mimic a natural experiment and is appropriate to our context,
explicitly dealingwith simultaneity issues and relevant time varying confounders.Wealso subject
the results to a battery of diagnostic, speciﬁcation and robustness checks. Of course, as in most
applied work, this thorough statistical testing cannot entirely rule out, for example, the possibil-
ity that covariates such as GDP per capita are endogenous themselves, potentially undermining
the exogeneity of our two IVs. Further research could explore these matters by seeking to es-
timate full structural models where each of the variables in question is treated as endogenous,
although it is important not to underestimate the challenges of ﬁnding plausible variables that
could satisfy the necessary exclusion restrictions. In any case, the comparison of our IV esti-
mation results with those from standard ﬁxed effects estimations highlights the need for future
studies in the topic to deal explicitly with the potential inﬂuence of reverse causal effects, as well
as other observable and unobservable confounding factors, to go beyond the identiﬁcation of
mere associations in the data.
Finally, it is worth stressing that our estimates reﬂect what would happen on average to pop-
ulation outcomes if countries experienced variations in health coverage (and if current health
programmes were proportionally scaled up). Of course, there are likely to be particular coun-
try idiosyncrasies hidden by these averages. The positive effect of incremental publicly pooled
expenditure on mortality is probably not an inevitable outcome. Some indicative evidence has
suggested that the quality of governance and national institutions (stability of the political
system, degree of public sector accountability and so forth) may inﬂuence the effectiveness of
public spending, and that the beneﬁcial effects of government health expenditures on child and
maternal outcomes may be larger in better governed and more equitable countries (Wagstaff
and Claeson, 2004; Tolmie, 2007). In our sample, even though the examination of regression
residuals shows that our econometric models do a good job in predicting the observedmortality
outcomes across countries, there are some countries for which relatively large residuals indicate
that there may be other factors inﬂuencing observed mortality, beyond those accounted for in
our models. As examples among LMICs, Burundi and Malawi consistently exhibit observed
under-5 mortality rates that are lower than the levels predicted by the models, whereas the
opposite is true for countries like Trinidad and Tobago, Equatorial Guinea and some Middle-
Eastern nations. It would be valuable for future studies to examine possible reasons for these
outliers, including the inﬂuence of speciﬁc institutional and governance arrangements, by using
case-study methodologies.
World Health Organization (2010) claimed that many countries are still lacking the necessary
investment in the health sector that is needed to improve population outcomes in line with
the millennium development goals. Our study offers hard evidence that investing in broader
health coverage can generate signiﬁcant gains in terms of population health. Therefore, if such
improvements are policy priorities, we believe that countries with sufﬁcient resources should
regard enhancements in health system coverage as a key investment target, and the international
community should assist the poorest countries in moving towards broader coverage over the
coming years.
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